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NOTES
UNDERSTANDING FArm: WHEN RELIGIOUS PARENTS
DECLINE CONVENTIONAL MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR
THEIR CHILDREN
I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrinal teachings of Christian Science,' Jehovah's Wit-
ness,2 and numerous other religious minorities in America3 oppose
1. Christian Science is a branch of Christianity established in the United States in
1879. As a central tenet, Christian Science relies on God for healing. Through the help of
practitioners specially trained in praying for and counseling the sick, believers attest that
the concentration of faith cures disease without doctors, drugs, or surgery. For an over-
view of the teachings of Christian Science, see CATHERINE L. ALBANESE, AMERICA: RELI-
GIONS AND RELIGION 235-40 (2d ed. 1992); CHRISTIAN SCIENCE PUBLISHING SOCIETY,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE: A SOURCEBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY MATERIALS (1990). This Note
relies heavily on Christian Science treatises, testimonies, and other resources to support its
arguments. These sources are used not because they are more authoritative than any other
religious source, but because they are voluminous, readily available, and reveal the signifi-
cance of religious belief and conduct in the context of medical treatment decisions.
2. Adherents to Jehovah's Witness interpret blood tranfusions as a violation of biblical
prohibitions against the ingestion of another human's blood. Thus, they traditionally shun
transfusions, any medical procedure that increases the likelihood of transfusion, or even
the recirculation of their own blood once it has been removed from their bodies, even
where a transfusion may be necessary to save an otherwise healthy person. See, e.g., In
re Alice Hughes, 611 A.2d 1148 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (involving a Jehovah's
Witness who had refused blood tiansfusions prior to undergoing a hysterectomy in which
complications arose). For general discussions of the Jehovah's Witness position regarding
blood transfusions, see Gary R. Anderson, Medicine vs. Religion: The Case of Jehovah's
Witnesses, 8 HEALTH AND Soc. WORK 31 (1983); J. Lowell Dixon & M. Gene Smalley,
Jehovah's Witnesses: The SurgicallEthical Challenge, 246 JAMA 2471 (1981).
3. See, e.g., In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1982) (involving followers of the
General Assembly and the Church of the First Born, which resist medical care in favor of
spiritual treatment); In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (describ-
ing a tenet of The Church of God of the Union Assembly requiring adherents to "live by
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all or certain medical treatments. Following these tenets, members
perceive great harm in conventional care. Thus, parents who abide
by these faiths may be inclined to withhold conventional medical
care from their ailing children.
The number of adherents to religious faiths that proscribe
conventional care seems small in comparison to the rest of modem
society.' To many citizens, these religious faiths seem preposter-
ous.' Yet reliance on faith in God to spare a child is rooted in the
same ancient authority upon which most Americans' religious be-
liefs are grounded In the book of Genesis, Abraham's God in-
structs him to take his son to the sacrificial altar.' Abraham un-
questioningly complies despite the awful prospect of losing his
child. As he wields his knife above his son, Abraham hears an
angel's call. He learns that because of his unwavering faith, God
will not take his son's life. Obedience to God's word regarding the
welfare of one's child is a fundamental element of most
Americans' religious upbringing.
Despite the ancient foundation of this principle in the majority
faith" rather than by "medicine, vaccinations or shots of any kind"); see also Wayne F.
Malecha, Note, Faith Healing Exemptions to Child Protection Laws: Keeping the Faith
Versus Medical Care for Children, 12 J. LEGIs. 243, 244-46 (1985) (detailing the history
of the Faith Assembly church, which teaches reliance on faith healing).
4. See, e.g., Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491
U.S. 905 (1989). The cases cited thus far illustrate the position of parents who withhold
medical treatment for religious reasons. See supra notes 2-3.
5. Exact numbers of adherents to religious groups which oppose some or all conven-
tional medical treatment are not available. The Christian Science Church reports it has
approximately 500,000 members in the United States; critics call that estimate an exagger-
ation. See David Margolick, In Children's Deaths, a Test for Christian Science, N.Y.
TIMEs, August 6, 1990, at A-11 (chronicling parental prosecutions and the perspectives
from both sides). If one includes, however, the number of Americans whose religious doc-
trine imposes any restrictions involving conventional medical treatment, the estimate would
rise dramatically. Roman Catholic opposition to abortion and contraception is well known;
however, numerous other religious systems, including Judaism, Islam, and Old Order
Amish, contain tenets which may conflict with conventional medical treatment. See gener-
ally THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIoEmrucs (Warren T. Reich ed., 1978) (providing background
information regarding medical perspectives of each of these religions).
6. The prosecutions of religious parents who withhold medical care, as well as the
media attention accorded the prosecutions, reflect society's general perception of the reli-
gious parents' positions as inappropriate. See, e.g., Margolick, supra note 5, at A- 1I
(characterizing the common facts involved in Christian Science parents' prosecutions as
"horrific").
7. Approximately 83% of Americans adhere to the Judeo-Christian tradition which
grows out of the Old Testament. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 70 (114th ed. 1994) (Table 85).
8. Genesis 22:1-19.
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culture, state legislatures condemn the practice of withholding med-
ical care from children based on the state's asserted interest in
protecting children.9 However, even courts adopting the states'
position have recognized that the parents on trial for relying on
spiritual treatment do not intend to harm the children; the parents
truly believe their actions would have been of benefit." To the
parents, withholding medical care or relying on spiritual treatment
is the safest and best choice for the child; it is the choice least
likely to cause the child harm.'
Despite their beneficent intent in withholding conventional
care, parents who decline conventional treatment for religious rea-
sons may face civil and criminal penalties for their children's
deaths. 2 Parents may invoke the First Amendment protection of
free exercise as a defense, thus triggering strict scrutiny of the
9. See infra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
10. See Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 867-68 (Cal. 1988) (discussing cases
in which courts acknowledged that defendants were sincere, affectionate, and intended no
harm to the child), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989); Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617
N.E.2d 609, 620 (Mass. 1993) (stating that "[e]vidence showed that the-defendant parents
were deeply motivated toward helping their child").
11. See Nathan A. Talbot, The Position of the Christian Science Church, 309 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1641 (1983) (summarizing the benefits of the Christian Science dependence
on spiritual treatment for children); Emily K. Worden, When Ethics Clash: Helping Pa-
tients Caught Between Religion and Medicine, 5 NURsING LIFE 48 (1985) (recognizing the
need, as a caregiver, to respect Jehovah's Wimess parents as loving, caring people when
their religious beliefs clash with medicine). Despite the lack of the parents' ill will toward
their children, courts find legally sufficient culpability as their conduct must be judged
against a reasonable person standard. The debatable issue of whether religious people
ought to be judged by comparing them to reasonable people who do not follow the tenets
of their faith is beyond the scope of this Note.
12. See, e.g., Walker, 763 P.2d at 852 (involving parents charged with involuntary
manslaughter and felony child endangerment); Hermanson v. State, 570 So. 2d 322 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming conviction of Christian Science parents charged with child
abuse resulting in third-degree murder), vacated, 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992); Twitchell,
617 N.E.2d at 609 (charging Christian Science parents with involuntary manslaughter);
State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63 (Minn. 1991) (charging Christian Science parents with
second-degree manslaughter), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1036 (1992).
In addition to criminal and civil suits, parents may face the imposition of forced
medical care for children. See, e.g., People ex rel Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769
(Ill. 1952) (justifying the compulsion of a blood transfusion for eight-day-old infant over
parents' religious objections on the basis of the state's interest in protecting life), cert. de-
nied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); In re Gregory, 380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1976) (or-
dering medical and dental examinations for three children whose mother, a member of the
Church of God and Christ, refused such treatment). See generally Barry Nobel, Religious
Healing in the Courts: The Liberties and Liabilities of Patients, Parents, and Healers, 16
U. PUGET SOUND L. Rnv. 599, 636-55 (1993) (chronicling state and judicial compulsion
of life-saving, corrective, or preventative medical attention).
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applicable laws. However, courts that reach the constitutional ques-
tion unanimously characterize the state's interest in protecting chil-
dren as paramount. Despite the possibility of exempting religious
indlividuals burdened by generally applicable laws, the judicial
decisions do not question the preeminence of the states' interest in
protecting children. Almost automatically, courts find the interest
sufficiently compelling to justify the burden that punishing the
parents imposes on religious free exercise.
This mechanical legal balancing, however, does not adequately
reflect the interests of religious parents. The compelling interest test
reflects the secular vision of legislatures and judges, overlooking or
trivializing the perhaps immeasurable value of faith to the believer.
Understanding the nature of religious faith casts doubt upon the
appropriateness of weighing the state's abstract interest in child
welfare more heavily than the parent's religious interest.
This Note does not advance the impossible position that the
state may never assert its interest in protecting children against the
rights of a religious parent, or even that a religious parent's right
to make health care decisions for a child is absolute. Children
deserve special protection. When faced with a religious parent
declining conventional treatment, however, the court should not
begin and end its inquiry with what the state perceives to be the
child's best interest.
Part II of this Note summarizes the judiciary's application of
the compelling interest test to situations in which parents face civil
or criminal punishment for unsuccessfully relying on faith to heal
their gravely ill children. The legal background section also in-
cludes the treatment by the Supreme Court and Congress of reli-
gious individuals requesting exemption from generally applicable
laws.
Part Im of this Note suggests why the compelling interest test
inadequately protects the religious interests of parents who were
disappointed in their reliance on faith by attempting to elucidate
the importance of religious faith in the life of the believer. The
guarantee of First Amendment religious liberty ought to protect
free exercise, especially in cases where religion attains its greatest
functional value. According to the sociology of religion, religion's
ultimate purpose is to respond to the existential suffering of hu-
mans in the face of mortality. Religious beliefs that dictate forbear-
ance from conventional medical treatment are most sorely tested
when the believer confronts a child's critical illness. Yet, as con-
cluded in Part IV, it is precisely at that time when the religion
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serves its most important role in the life of the believing parent.
Though the state's abstract interest in protecting children may re-
main compelling, understanding the value of faith supports the
parents' exemption from punishment.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Parents' Religious Decisions to Forego Childrens'
Medical Treatment
The Supreme Court has never decided a case in which parents
faced civil or criminal punishment for declining conventional life-
saving treatment for their child on religious grounds. However, in a
nonmedical context, the Court has pronounced that the state's inter-
est in protecting children easily overrides parental religious free-
dom, regardless of the severity of the burden. 3 In Prince v. Mas-
sachusetts,4 the Court established that the "right to practice reli-
gion freely does not include liberty to expose ... the . . . child to
ill health or death."'" The Court asserted that even the defendant
to the action could "hardly dispute[] . . . that the state has a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in
things affecting the child's welfare."'" The state, acting in parens
patriae," could legitimately restrict individuals' religious freedom
in order to protect the well-being of children under their guardian-
ship.
Interestingly, Prince did not involve a religious parent's deci-
sion which jeopardized the life of a child. Rather, the defendant
allowed a child in her custody to sell Jehovah's Witness reading
materials in violation of child labor laws. 8 In Prince, the circum-
stances posed no direct or immediate threat to a child's life or
13. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) (stating that the power
of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation if
it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the well-being of the child); Jacobsen v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905) (recognizing the state's overriding interest in pro-
tecting "[tihe safety and the health of the people").
14. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
15. Id. at 166-67 (citing People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903)).
16. ILd. at 167.
17. Under the doctrine of parens patriae, dating back to the English constitutional
system, the power to act as "father of the country" passed from the king to the states.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the doctrine as early as 1890. See Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890).
18. Prince, 321 U.S. at 161-62.
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health. Absent such a threat, the Court's martyrdom language re-
flects the facile manner in which it discounted the parent's or
guardian's religious interest. An individual "martyring" herself by
selling the Watch Tower, the Jehovah's Witness paper, may not
comparably martyr a child: "Parents may be free to become mar-
tyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make
that choice for themselves."'9
The martyrdom language was conveniently appropriated by a
court deciding specifically whether to punish a parent for her reli-
gious decision to forego life-saving medical treatment for her child.
In Walker v. Superior Court,2 the California Supreme Court di-
rectly confronted whether the religious liberty guaranteed by the
free exercise clause exempted a parent who relied on spiritual
treatment for a child from criminal culpability. The defendant was
a Christian Scientist whose administration of spiritual treatment
failed to cure her daughter's acute meningitis.
The Walker court categorized the protection of the lives of the
state's children as "an interest of unparalleled significance."'" The
court asserted that all of society depends upon the welfare of chil-
dren; a democratic society rests, for its continuance, "'upon [the]
healthy, well-rounded growth [of young people] into full maturity
as citizens."'" While the court acknowledged the possibility that
the mother intended only to benefit the child, the court implied
that she actually sacrificed the life of her daughter and found that
"[riegardless of the severity of the religious imposition, the govern-
mental interest is plainly adequate to justify its restrictive ef-
fect. , , 3
Due to the absence of life-threatening circumstances in Prince,
the Supreme Court obviously did not require a threat to the child's
life to trigger the state's compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren.24 However, the relevant state statutes in Walker regarding
19. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
20. 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988) (holding that treatment for a dying child by spiritual
means alone does not exempt the parents from felony liability although such an exemp-
tion exists in non-life-threatening situations), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
21. Id. at 869.
22. Id. (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 168).
23. Id. at 870.
24. In fact, the in parens patriae doctrine has been invoked to uphold mandatory
school attendance laws, see State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730, 732 (Ind. 1901); regulation or
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parents' obligation to obtain health care for their children reflect
this policy s California exempts a parent or guardian from culpa-
bility for child neglect, a misdemeanor, if spiritual treatment is ad-
ministered to an ailing child.' However, if the child dies without
receiving medical care, the parents may be liable under involuntary
manslaughter and felony child endangerment provisions for the
failure to obtain medical care.' California's statutory scheme is
typical of most states.
prohibition of child labor, see Sturges & Burn Mfg. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325
(1913); and compulsory vaccination laws, see Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38
(1905).
25. Wrongful death actions against the religious parents inherently reflect a policy not
to interfere until the child's condition is life-threatening, as they accrue only when the
parents' reliance on faith for a cure has proven unsuccessful.
26. Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 856-62 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491
U.S. 905 (1989). The exemption to child neglect in California is as follows:
If a parent provides a minor with treatment by spiritual means through prayer
alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or
religious denomination, by a duly accredited practitioner thereof, such treatment
shall constitute "other remedial care", as used in this section.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988).
27. Involuntary manslaughter is defined as the unlawful killing of a human being with-
out malice "in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the
commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or with-
out due caution or circumspection." CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (West 1988). The felony
child endangerment statute provides: "Any person who, under circumstances or conditions
likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to
suffer, or . . . willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that
its person or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment .... " Id. § 273a(1).
28. For a list of states which recognize spiritual healing as a means of treatment under
child neglect or endangerment statutes, see Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 776 n.1
(Fla. 1992).
Parents have successfully argued the statutory scheme violates due process, as the
criminality of their reliance on spiritual treatment depends on the outcome. See, e.g., id.
at 781 (quashing a conviction under Florida's felony child abuse and third-degree murder
statutes on the grounds that the statutes failed to clearly indicate the point at which a
parent's reliance on religious beliefs in the treatment of the child became criminal con-
duct); State v. McKown, 461 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), affd, 475 N.W.2d 63
(Minn. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1036 (1992) (dismissing indictiments of parents who
withheld medical treatment for religious reasons due to the due process violation inherent
in the statutory scheme). But see, e.g., Walker, 763 P.2d at 871-73 (denying a due pro-
cess violation based on lack of fair notice); Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609,
617 n.13 (Mass. 1993) (asserting that Walker was the more reasoned analysis compared to
Hermanson and McKown).
The Walker court explained that the exemption at the level of child neglect did not
negate the state's in parens patriae interest in the child's well-being. Walker, 763 P.2d at
858-60. Despite the criminal nature of the charge, the child neglect statutes did not intend
to punish neglectful parents. Id. at 859. Rather, the legislature meant to protect the public
from the burden of routinely supporting a child who has an able parent. Id.
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The exceptions for spiritual treatment are an example of the
state legislatures' general overt protection of the right of religious
parents to control their children's health care within the framework
of society's broad respect for the private realm of family life. The
judiciary fiercely protects a wide range of parental decisions from
government interference.29 Parenting rights, including decisions
regarding child-bearing and child-rearing, are "basic civil rights '3
which constitute a "fundamental liberty interest"'" under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "It is settled
now ... that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to
interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and
parenthood. 32 Specifically, parents possess the right to make deci-
sions regarding their children's religion and religious upbringing.33
The right of parents to make virtually all health care decisions
for their children stems from these more general parenting rights
that the Supreme Court has declared fundamental. "The history and
culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This pri-
mary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition."'34
Parents possess the controlling, if not sole, capacity to make deci-
sions concerning their child's welfare. According to the Supreme
Court, "[it] is cardinal . . . that the custody, care and nurture of
29. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972) (upholding the interest of
parents in guiding the religious future and education of their children); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating a state statute requiring students to
attend public rather than private schools as it "unreasonably interferes with the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their con-
trol"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing the right of an individ-
ual under the Fourteenth Amendment "to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience").
30. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
31. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
32. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806 (1992).
33. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14, 231-32 (1972) (affirming "the
fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious
future and education of their children"); Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 (recognizing the rights of
parents to give children religious training and to encourage them in the practice of reli-
gious belief); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating statute forbid-
ding children to attend private schools). See also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF
DISBELIEF: How LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 192 (1993) ("['No
nation that strips away the right of parents to raise their children in their religion is wor-
thy of allegiance.").
34. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
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the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder."35
The custodial prerogatives of parents over their children en-
compass the power to make specific health care decisions for the
child. 6 The Supreme Court has affirmed that an individual's con-
stitutional liberty interests include the right to be free of unwanted
medical treatment,37 even if the treatment is life-saving,38 despite
the general interest of the state in protecting life. To refuse parents
authority for making health care decisions for their children may
deprive the children of their constitutional right to decline treat-
ment. "Children... retain 'rights,' to be sure, but often such
rights are only meaningful as they are exercised by agents acting
with the best interests of their principals in mind."39 As urged by
Justice Brennan, to deny the exercise of the right through the re-
sponsible guardian would be to deny the right itself.' The state's
general interest in an individual's life cannot be abstracted from the
interest of the person living that life, or from the interest of one
guaranteed the right to make decisions in that person's welfare.4'
Despite the broad rights of parents, the Walker court empha-
sized that serious health problems trigger the state's willingness to
interfere. When the child's condition deteriorates and becomes life-
threatening, the state need not respect the reliance of parents on
their religious faith:
[P]rayer treatment will be accommodated as an acceptable
means of attending to the needs of a child only insofar as
35. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
36. The California Supreme Court has specifically held that custody of a child includes
the right to make decisions regarding the child's care, health, and religion. Burge v. City
and County of San Francisco, 262 P.2d 6, 12 (Cal. 1953) (holding that custody of a
child includes the right to make health care and religious decisions for the child).
37. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). The Cruzan
majority applied the due process clause to find a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment. The dissenting opinion characterized the right of
competent individuals to refuse medical treatment as fundamental. Id. at 304-09 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion has been read as raising the right to
refuse treatment to a fundamental level as well. See Richard E. Shugrue, The Patient Self-
Determination Act, 26 CREIGHTON L. REv. 751, 759 (1993).
38. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79.
39. Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988)).
40. Id
41. Id.
8 9
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serious physical harm or illness is not at risk. When a
child's life is placed in danger, we discern no intent to
shield parents from the chastening prospect of felony liabil-
ity.
42
The Walker court accepted an inherent flaw in the statutory
scheme. "'Under ordinary circumstances .... the case of a true be-
liever in faith healing will not even come to the attention of the
authorities, unless and until someone dies.' 43 The court recog-
nized that parents could not be punished until a child died. At that
point the state's interest in protecting a particular child was largely
moot. Regardless of this inconsistency, the Walker court upheld the
legitimacy of the statutory scheme which subordinated the parents'
religious liberties to the state's in parens patriae interest in the
welfare of a gravely ill child.'
In Walker and other cases in which parents and guardians face
civil or criminal penalties for their religiously motivated refusal of
conventional medical treatment for their children, the defendants
argued that the free exercise clause of the First Amendment pro-
tected their decisions.' Parents and guardians argue that tradition-
al statutory and common law doctrines should not apply when reli-
gious belief inspires the decision to withhold conventional treat-
ment.' Thus, these cases comprise one segment of a broader de-
bate over whether the Free Exercise Clause requires the creation of
religious exemptions from generally applicable laws with secular
purposes.
42. Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 866 (Cal. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S.
905 (1989).
43. Id. at 871 (quoting Comment, Religious Beliefs and the Criminal Justice System:
Some Problems of the Faith Healer, 8 LOYOLA L.A. L. REv. 396, 403-04 (1975)). Anoth-
er line of cases has developed in which state agents become aware of the reliance of
parents on spiritual healing for sick children before the child dies, raising the issue of
whether courts may order treatment over the parents' religious objections. See, e.g., People
ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773 (Ill. 1952) (ordering a blood transfusion
for a child who would "almost certainly die" without it), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824
(1952); In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (compelling a
seven-year-old to accept treatment which gave him a 60% chance of survival).
44. Walker, 763 P.2d at 866.
45. See, e.g., id. at 869-71. Because the courts in Hermanson and McKown dismissed
the criminal cases on due process grounds, they declined to reach the constitutional de-
fenses presented by the parties. Hermanson, 604 So. 2d at 781; McKown, 475 N.W.2d at
69 n.9.
46. See, e.g., Walker, 763 P.2d at 852 (illustrating parents arguing that they should not
be prosecuted for the death of their daughter because of their religious beliefs barring
medical treatment).
900 [Vol. 45:891
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B. The Free Exercise Exemption Generally
Government action which substantially burdens an individual's
free exercise of religion traditionally receives review under the
compelling interest standard. As was argued in Walker, religious
conduct is protected from encroachment by the government under
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.47 However,
the Supreme Court initially declined to protect religious conduct by
distinguishing it from religious belief. In Reynolds v. United
States,' the Court ruled that while laws "cannot interfere with
mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices."49
Under the Reynolds test, the Court granted absolute protection to
religious beliefs while denying any protection to religious conduct,
regardless of the impact of the government's action on free exer-
cise.5"
Although the Court denied absolute protection to religious
conduct, it subsequently provided some protection from government
infringement by requiring strict scrutiny of government action that
substantially burdens religious conduct. In Sherbert v. Verner,"1
the plaintiff was discharged by her employer and was unable to
find other work because her religion, Seventh-Day Adventism,
prohibited her from working on Saturday. The state did not consid-
er religious motivation "good cause" for rejecting suitable work,
and denied her claim for unemployment compensation benefits. 2
The Supreme Court ruled, however, that when a state burdens an
individual's free exercise of religious belief, it can justify its action
only by showing a "compelling state interest." 3 After finding that
the denial of benefits indirectly imposed a burden on the plaintiff's
free exercise, 4 the Court held that the state could not justify the
burden because it failed to prove that denying the claimant her
47. The free exercise clause states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... U.S. CONST. amend. I.
48. 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding conviction of a Mormon for violating a federal
prohibition on polygamy in the territories of the United States).
49. 1& at 166.
50. Id. at 166-67.
51. 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (ruling that all government actions burdening the free
exercise of religion must serve a compelling interest).
52. Id. at 400-01.
53. Id. at 406.
54. Id at 403.
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benefits was necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest.'5
The Sherbert Court's opinion offered some guidance in deter-
mining what qualified as a compelling state interest by stating that
"only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation."56 According to the Court,
only public dangers meet this definition and justify burdening the
free exercise of religion. Specifically, the conduct permissibly regu-
lated in prior cases "invariably posed some substantial threat to
public safety, peace or order."'
Interpreted strictly, the substantiality component of the compel-
ling interest test under Sherbert could serve to invalidate almost
every law that offends any individual's religious sensibilities or
practices, thus paralyzing the government's ability to advance secu-
lar principles. 8 Recognizing this threat, the Court denied that the
First Amendment requires "the Government itself to behave in
ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual
development."59 The "incidental effects of government programs,
which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but
which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary
to their religious beliefs,"' do not require the government to
prove a compelling state interest. In contrast, where government
action compels individuals, "by threat of sanctions, to refrain from
religiously motivated conduct or to engage in conduct that they
find objectionable for religious reasons,"' the state must establish
a compelling interest.
The Sherbert compelling interest test does not limit the inter-
ests to be balanced against the government's to those of the indi-
55. Id. at 406-09.
56. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
57. Id. at 403.
58. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1986). In Bowen, the Supreme Court
refused to exempt a Native American receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) benefits from the statutory requirement that recipients furnish the state welfare
agencies with their Social Security numbers. The Court did not question the father's sin-
cerity in insisting that obtaining a Social Security number for his daughter would rob her
of spiritual purity in violation of his religious beliefs. Id. at 695-701. However, the Court
held that the government's interest in maintaining an efficient, fraud-resistant system out-
weighed the burden on the father's rights caused by forced compliance with the require-
ment. Id. at 712.
59. Id. at 699.
60. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988).
61. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 703.
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vidual religious believer. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 2 the Court grant-
ed an exemption from compulsory school attendance laws for the
Old Order Amish, who educate and train their children within their
own community after the eighth grade. The Court reiterated
Sherbert's ruling that "only those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the
free exercise of religion."'63 Though the Court identified the state's
"paramount responsibility"' for public education, the exemption
was justified as the Amish community's refusal to participate posed
no threat to "the public safety, peace, order, or welfare."
In the Yoder court's analysis, the scope of religious interests
that were considered extended far beyond the individual. First, the
Court recognized that the Amish people's religion encompassed
more than each individual's religious beliefs. Their religion embod-
ied the ritualistic conduct of the entire Amish community. "[Flor
the Old Order Amish, religion is not simply a matter of theocratic
belief... the Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines
virtually their entire way of life."' In other words, the religious
conduct itself played a vital role in the continued survival of the
religious community. Thus, the Court found that requiring atten-
dance would' not only take away the right of Amish parents to
control their children's upbringing, but would essentially deprive
the entire Amish community of its way of life.67
Forcing the Amish community to abandon its religious tradition
carried intolerable consequences:
The impact of the compulsory-attendance law ... carries
with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free
exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed
to prevent .... [It] carries with it a very real threat of
undermining the Amish community and religious practice
as they exist today; they must either abandon belief and be
assimilated into society at large, or be forced to migrate to
62. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
63. Id. at 215.
64. Id. at 213.
65. Id. at 230.
66. Id. at 216. Following scriptural commands, the Amish sect pursued an extremely
old-fashioned lifestyle, eschewing intellectual and scientific education and accomplishments,
and limiting contact with contemporary society. See id. at 216-17.
67. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 217-18, 232-33 (1972).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
some other and more tolerant region."
The societal evil of forced religious assimilation constituted a haz-
ard to the public interest in the First Amendment as well as to the
Amish community and its individual members. 9 Recognizing both
the subjective interests of the religious actors and the objective
interests of society in religious liberty, the Court awarded the ex-
emption."
Employment Division v. Smith" marked a significant departure
from Sherbert's strict scrutiny review of free exercise challenges to
generally applicable laws.72 Two members of the Native American
Church had been denied unemployment benefits after being dis-
charged for their use of peyote, a natural drug used in the
Church's sacraments. In its first review of the case, the Supreme
Court reasoned that if peyote use were illegal, imposing the lesser
penalty of the denial of unemployment benefits, as opposed to
imposing criminal sanctions, would not violate the free exercise
clause.73 On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court determined that
peyote use was illegal, but the State could not enforce its drug law
against sacramental peyote use without violating the First Amend-
68. Id. at 218.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 218-19. Since Yoder, the Supreme Court has not upheld a free exercise
claim on the merits against a general law, except for several unemployment benefits cases
directly analogous to Sherbert. For cases in which the Court found violation of the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment when a state denied unemployment benefits to a
person who refused certain work because of religious beliefs, see Frazee v. Illinois Dep't
of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
The absence of cases affirming Sherbert in other contexts has instigated charges that
the Court's purported highly protective attitude toward religion is without substance. See,
e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1994); William P. Marshall, The
Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 7 J. L. & Religion
363, 397-98 (1989). Furthermore, Congress' reference to pre-Smith cases as a guide for
RFRA interpretation may contain the same ambiguity. See Berg, supra at 26-28 (highlight-
ing this confusion). Further analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this Note.
71. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) [hereinafter Smith I1].
72. The Court has also diverged from strict scrutiny when reviewing regulations involv-
ing entities or institutions in which the government has a particularly active role. See
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987) (rejecting a First Amendment
challenge to a prison policy that prevented prisoners from attending weekly religious ser-
vices because of security concerns); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)
(deferring to military judgment regarding a regulation challenged under the free exercise
clause that prohibited the wearing of indoor headgear).
73. Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988).
[Vol. 45:891
1995] WHEN RELIGIOUS PARENTS DECLINE MEDICAL TREATMENT
ment.74 In its second review, the Supreme Court reversed the Ore-
gon Supreme Court, holding that enforcement of drug laws against
peyote users would not violate the free exercise clause.75 After
Smith II, courts were not compelled to grant exemptions from
generally applicable criminal laws to individuals whose religious
beliefs conflicted with those laws."
Recognizing that Smith II "virtually eliminated the requirement
that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed
by laws neutral toward religion," Congress enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in November, 1993.78 Through-
out the legislative history, Congress recognized that "laws 'neutral'
toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws
purported on their face to interfere with religious exercise." '79 Fur-
thermore, Congress emphasized the need to preserve for minority
religions the same free exercise rights enjoyed by more established
religions, whose religious rights are not likely to be encroached by
neutral laws."0 Congress concluded that the compelling interest
analysis was a "workable test for striking sensible balances be-
tween religious liberty and competing prior governmental inter-
ests."'" Thus, Congress guaranteed RFRA's application in all free
exercise claims, even those brought against laws of general applica-
bility.8
2
By mandating strict scrutiny, RFRA prevents states from con-
cealing intentional discrimination against religious minorities
through the use of facially neutral laws. 3 While the mandate con-
stitutes a preemptive strike against any such deliberate handicap-
ping of religious minorities, RFRA also enables a person whose
free exercise was violated to "assert that violation as a claim or
74. Smith v. Employment Div., 763 P.2d 146 (1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
75. Smith II, 494 U.S. at 890.
76. Despite its denial that the free exercise clause alone mandates exemption, the ma-
jority acknowledged the force of a hybrid free exercise right, that is, when the free exer-
cise clause is invoked in conjunction with other constitutional protections to bar the ap-
plication of neutral, generally applicable laws to religiously motivated conduct. Id. at 881-
82. Justice Scalia explicitly included the right of parents to make certain decisions regard-
ing their childrens' upbringing. Id. at 881.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4) (1993).
78. Id. § 2000bb.
79. Id. § 2000bb(a)(2).
80. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 88, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1993).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5).
82. Id. § 2000bb-3.
83. H.R. REP. No. 88, supra note 80, at 6.
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defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief
against the government."84 By offering a remedy for governmental
intrusions upon an individual's free exercise right, the legislation
acknowledges the harm suffered when the government restricts or
denies an individual the freedom to adhere to the tenets of faith.'
While § 2000bb(b)(1) of RFRA mandates the restoration of the
standard set by Sherbert6 and Yoder,87 the legislative history di-
rects courts to refer to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith H
for guidance in determining if religious exercise has been burdened
and whether the least restrictive means possible have been em-
ployed in furthering the government's compelling interest.88
I. THE RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE
The extreme circumstances in which a religious parent faces
civil or criminal punishment for declining conventional medical
treatment for a gravely ill child dramatically illustrate the
judiciary's need to understand the function of religion, and thereby
its value, to a believer. To observers ignorant of the value of the
believer's faith, the decision to forego medical treatment is incom-
prehensible. Only by attempting to understand the parent's faith to
the best of its ability may the judiciary fairly conclude that the
government's interest outweighs that of the religious parent. The
perhaps immeasurable value of faith in such circumstances provides
strong support for parental exemption from civil and criminal pun-
ishment for declining conventional medical treatment for religious
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c).
85. See S. REP. No. 111, supra note 80, at 4-5, 8 (discussing the importance of pro-
tecting religious practices from govermental intrusions).
86. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text (discussing
Sherbert).
87. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (discussing
Yoder). Congress' reliance on Yoder as an interpretive tool is particularly significant, as
the decision has been called the "high water mark" for free exercise claims. Jesse H.
Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty, 70
NEB. L. REv. 651, 657 (1991).
88. H.R. REP. No. 88, supra note 80, at 6-7. The statutory endorsement of the consti-
tutionally compelled free exercise exemption renders largely moot the academic debate
over the propriety of religious exemptions. Opponents of religious exemptions emphasized
the inherent conflicts with the fundamental constitutional principle of equal treatment and
with the establishment clause, see Marshall, supra note 70, at 363-96 (articulating the
criticisms of the free exercise exemption doctrine), and the potential for religious
imposters to obtain parallel benefits as those exempted from laws of general applicability
under the free exercise, see Berg, supra note 70, at 43 (describing the threat of "strategic
behavior" by nonreligious individuals to obtain favorable treatment).
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reasons.
To punish parents for their reliance on faith, when their need
for it is most acute and when faith's intrinsic value is the highest
seems at best, nonsensical, and at worst, oppressive. Yet, although
the compelling interest test does not allow the state to interfere in
a parent's religious decision to forego conventional medical treat-
ment for a child until the child's life is threatened, it supports
punishment if the parent's reliance on faith is unsuccessful. In the
peculiar circumstances in which a religious parent declines conven-
tional medical treatment for a gravely ill child, religion may fulfill
its ultimate function of providing meaning amidst apparent
meaninglessness in the believer's life. The parents' reliance on faith
reflects the incredible significance of religion's role in their lives.
This unusual if not unique value supports the parents' exemption
from punishment for their decision under the free exercise clause
of the First Amendment, regardless of the traditionally "compel-
ling" nature of the state's interest in protecting children.
To support this argument, this section first articulates the nature
of religious faith as understood by students of religion. Proceeding
from this understanding, this section argues that the crisis confront-
ed by parents who decline conventional medical treatment for reli-
gious reasons is a paradigmatic example of how religious identity
and experience meets the parents' needs. Thus, the parents' deci-
sion deserves First Amendment protection in deference both to the
parents' and society's interests in religious liberty. The nature of
the parents' faith in such a crisis also exposes the questionable
effectiveness of punishment, which further reduces the countervail-
ing weight of the state's interest in protecting children.
A. The Nature of Faith
Because secular observers may have difficulty accepting the
needs of religious believers and the extent to which religious faith
fulfills those needs, the First Amendment guarantee of religious
free exercise may be hollow if those charged with enforcing it fail
to understand what it protects. Defining religion may comprise the
most problematic aspect of the free exercise principle.89 Yet, to
concede the inability to reach a working understanding of "reli-
gion" would nullify the substantive guarantee of its free exercise.
89. Both the judiciary and commentators perceive great risk in attempting to define
religion, as the act of defining inherently limits what is recognized as religion. See Mar-
shall, supra note 70, at 390.
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Academics use three approaches to describe religion: substan-
tive, formal, and functional." The substantive definitions focus on
the inner core of particular religions, tending to emphasize a rela-
tionship with a higher being or beings, and are favored by theolo-
gians and philosophers.9' Formal definitions of religion, usually
offered by historians, describe the formalities present within com-
parative religions: the sacred stories, rituals, and communities.'
Functional definitions, in contrast, emphasize the effects and signif-
icance of religion in the actual lives of believers. Preferred by
scholars in the social sciences, "[t]hey stress the systems of mean-
ing-making that religion provides and how it helps people deal
with the ills, insecurities, and catastrophes of living."93
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of religion's
functional role in its attempt to articulate religion's nature. In two
cases decided during the Vietnam War, Welsh v. United States94
and United States v. Seeger," the Court interpreted the term "reli-
gious" as used in a federal statute granting conscientious objector
status.96
Exploring the meaning of the term, the Court articulated a
functional definition of religion. The believer's view that his con-
90. See ALBANESE, supra note 1, at xxi.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Albanese acknowledges that a definition of religion is impossible, for religion
encompasses all of human life and defies the logical boundaries of good definitions. In-
stead, Albanese attempts to describe religion by recognizing its forms and functions. A
religion defined, or even described, solely by the beliefs which comprise it, is incomplete.
94. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
95. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
96. See Universal Miltary Training and Service Act § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612 (1948). The
Court interpreted the statute to determine whether the registrants could be prosecuted for
their failure to submit to induction in the armed forces, rather than using a balancing test
as in the parental exemptions. The statute codified a religious exemption to the otherwise
universally applicable induction process; thus, it codified the legislature's position that an
individual's religious objection to war trumps the federal government's interest in efficient-
ly raising an army in wartime. The statute provided, in part, that
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant irairng and service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously op-
posed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this
connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being in-
volving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not
include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code.
Id. at 612-13.
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victions were not religious was not determinative,' nor was the
substantive content of the beliefs themselves." The Court also
declared that intensely personal convictions might strike a nonbe-
liever as incomprehensible or wrong, yet deserve protection none-
theless as religious beliefs. While acknowledging the importance
of the registrant's sincerity, the Court pointed out that the central
consideration in determining whether the registrant's beliefs were
religious was whether these beliefs played the role of a religion
and functioned as a religion in the registrant's life."°°
Thus, the Court's interpretive efforts to define "religious" fo-
cused not on the substance of the religious beliefs-what the be-
liefs are-but on their function- what the beliefs do-in the
believer's life. The Court recognized the most obvious function of
religious belief, that of fundamentally directing an individual's
behavior. Religious doctrine "communicates to man in some way a
consciousness of what is right and should be done, [and] what is
wrong and therefore should be shunned."'O' Applying this func-
tional test to the registrants' claims, the Court respected the signifi-
cance and force of the registrants' religious convictions in shaping
their objections to serving in the armed forces, and granted their
rights to exemption." The functional approach precluded the
Court's need to assess the substance of the beliefs themselves to
determine their religious nature, and thereby their protection under
the First Amendment.
The context of religious parents who face punishment for de-
clining conventional medicine for their children further underscores
the importance of a functional approach to religious belief. While
the majority of society easily attests to the beneficial role of con-
ventional medicine, the benefits of religion in the lives of parents
declining medical treatment is much more difficult to recognize.
Yet, if a nonbeliever can acknowledge religion's positive val-
97. In Welsh, neither registrant could assert that his beliefs were religious in the con-
ventional sense. Also, neither registrant could confirm or deny that he believed in a Su-
preme Being, nor could either registrant confirm that he was affiliated with any recog-
nized religious institution or group. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335-37.
98. The Court emphasized that delving into the substantive content of petitioners' be-
liefs to determine the meaning of "religious" violated the "long-established policy of not
picking and choosing among religious beliefs." Seeger, 380 U.S. at 163.
99. Id. at 184-85.
100. Id.
101. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 338 (1970).
102. Id. at 343-44; United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 186-87 (1965).
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ue-what religion does for the believer throughout the crisis-the
parents' decision becomes easier to understand even if the nonbe-
liever cannot accept the underlying substantive beliefs.
Before exploring the purposes of religion as a means of under-
standing its value, it is worthwhile to assert a simple premise.
Religion is not purely rational. It contains both rational and nonra-
tional elements."°3 Thus, those who automatically dismiss the non-
rational may be unable to understand the value of religious faith to
a believer. Yet, the judiciary's task is to weigh the facts and prin-
ciples implicated in the case before it. Where a parent declined
medical treatment for religious reasons, judges and jurors must
envision the state of mind of the religious defendant and consider
the parent's nonrational response to a situation. To refuse to accept
the nonrational elements of religion as reasonable, without under-
standing their nature as does the believer, violates the duty of a
judge. It is possible, without accepting a religious doctrine, for a
nonbeliever to understand and respect the function of religious faith
in the life of a believer.
The functional view emphasizes religion's ability to strengthen
people who face an unknown. The boundaries dividing the known
from the unknown can be physical,' for instance, a boundary
dividing land that is familiar and secure, from land that is unrecog-
nized and frightening. Life demands temporal crossings as well,
such as birth, puberty, and death." Traversing the border from
one form of life into a new form is often deeply unnerving. To
ease the stress imposed when a boundary must be crossed, people
call on religion for special help:
This special assistance came from the mysterious and fear-
ful unknown, from forces that transcended, or went beyond,
ordinary life. In other words, alien land and people were
countered by a second form of "othemess," more powerful
than the first. By enlisting the help of this second
"otherness"' the first was overcome, and life could go on
as intended. These "other" forces that saved a difficult
103. MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF REuGION 10
(1959) (acknowledging the irrational nature of the phenomenon of religion, referred to as
"the sacred"). See also ANDREW M. GREELEY, RELIGION: A SECULAR THEORY 33-42
(1982) (describing the religious dimension of humans as "prerational').
104. ALBANESE, supra note 1, at 3.
105. Id. at 4.
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situation by their power were called religious.'"6
In this view, humans essentially create religion to support them-
selves during stressful times. By enveloping the believer in this
other power, religion comforts and guides the believer through
life's frightening experiences."
Death is the ultimate boundary with which religion directly
contends.' 5 All individuals, regardless of their religious nature,
confront mortality; "the fear of death is indeed a universal in the
human condition."'" Despite death's certainty, it "remains unap-
proachable, perplexing, frightening.".... The fear with which hu-
mans perceive death is existential; when contending with grief,
humans "feel most acutely the discontinuity, the meaninglessness,
of life."'
n
Certainly, religion as it is commonly understood is not the only
means with which humans assuage existential anxiety."2 Yet, reli-
gion holds infinite and unique value in the ultimate quest of the
human race:
[Rieligion alone gives hope, because it holds open the
dimension of the unknown and the unknowable... in
doing so, it relieves the absurdity of earthly life, all the
impossible limitations and frustrations of living mat-
ter .... Religion takes one's very creatureliness, one's
insignificance, and makes it a condition of hope. Full tran-
scendence of the human condition means limitless possibili-
ty unimaginable to us."'
106. Id.
107. See GREEEY, supra note 103, at 71 (stating that an individual encountering reli-
gious emotion perceives it as "other").
108. See id. at 15 (considering religion as an expression of hope against the inevitability
of death).
109. ERNEsT BECKER, THE DENAL OF DEATH at ix (1973).
110. Daniel Cappon, The Psychology of Dying, in THE IzNTRPRErATEON OF DEATH 61,
62 (Hendrik M. Ruitenbeek ed., 1984) (studying the fear of death in dying hospital pa-
tients).
111. JAMES P. CARSE, DEATH AND EXus'TENmCe A CONCETUAL HISTORY OF HuMAN
MORTALITY 7 (1980) (studying ten major conceptions of death and their views of the way
in which humans attempt to create continuity out of the discontinuity of death).
112. Herman Feifel, The Problem of Death, in THE INTERPRETATION OF DEATH, supra
note 110, at 125 (asserting that the major function of practically all religious and philo-
sophical systems of thought has been to deal with this fear).
113. BECKER, supra note 109, at 203-04. See also GREELEY, supra note 103, at 97 (as-
serting that in developing religious images an individual formulates a "worldview," a
response to the critical problems of human suffering and death, and asserting that the
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The propensity to hope thankfully may be a "biological giv-
en.""' 4 No one can prove that human life is guided by something
more than random, capricious chance. Throughout, humans experi-
ence "sickness, suffering, tragedy, injustice, disappointment, frustra-
tion, and eventually and inevitably death.""' 5 The unique ability
of humans to reason renders the propensity to hope as more than a
biological possibility; forced to recognize these realities, hope is
perhaps a biological and spiritual human need."6 If religion sus-
tains this hopefulness throughout the "outrages of human exis-
tence,""' 7 its value is immeasurable.
Again, those who do not question their own significance or do
not consider their belief systems religious may not comprehend an
individual's need for religious faith and activity. Yet, once the
need is recognized, an understanding of the ways religion fulfills
the needs of believers lends critical insight to the assessment of
religion's value. A fuller description of religion, its forms and
practices, may reveal its more tangible benefits as well as convey
the philosophical and psychological disadvantages of living without
faith.
The role of religious behavioral norms, ritual, and association
discredits the simple distinction between belief and conduct some
courts have relied upon to justify state encroachment of religious
practice:1"'
More than a form of belief, religion is a matter of practice.
Body and emotions play as large a role in a living religion
as philosophical concepts. Perhaps, in fact, they play a
larger role .... Mind and body are both necessary to hu-
man religious life."9
foundation for religion is hope).
114. GREELEY, supra note 103, at 18.
115. Id.
116. See BECKER, supra note 109, at 174 (quoting OTro RANK, BEYOND PSYCHOLOGY
194 (1958)). See also GREELEY, supra note 103, at 12 (suggesting that without hope,
despair might have wiped out the human species, which alone has acquired the capacity
to reflect on its own mortality).
117. GREELEY, supra note 103, at 18.
118. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (developing the Supreme Court's
view of the distinction between religious belief and conduct).
119. ALBANESE, supra note 1, at 8-9. Religious conduct, the acts which arise out of
religious belief, has had great significance in the formation and development of American
culture, beginning with the departure of the Puritans from England. The religious pluralism
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As the Supreme Court recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 2' reli-
gion does not exist simply as a set of beliefs. A religion consti-
tutes a system, a collection of stories, teachings, and symbols.'
Each component of a religious system advances the purpose of
religion in the lives of its adherents, reflecting the comforting
presence of the other. Religious creeds explain the meaning of
human life in the universe, often appearing as theologies or sacred
myths of origin. Defining a reason why a people appears in the
cosmos, creeds set forth the relationship of humans to the
"otherness," the divine.'" Codes govern everyday behavior. They
can be highly specific directives, or tacit conventions of a society.
The codes instruct people when and how to act in conformity with
the moral understanding that comes from the religious creeds,"
assuring believers of the righteousness of their actions. Cultuses,
rituals which act out the understandings expressed in the creed and
code, are means with which individuals summon and surround
themselves with the "other" power deified in the creed.'24 Finally,
religion is expressed in a community, the group of people within
the boundaries of a shared creed, code, and cultus." The com-
that typifies American culture mandated religious activity in addition to internal, spiritual
belief. Id. at 14. Throughout America's history, the separation of church and state required
membership in any religious organization to be voluntary, "leading in turn to a need for
religious activism to guarantee membership in a setting of religious competition." Id.
Continuing in the spirit of competition, religious groups noted Americans' preference for
religious experience over thought, and avoided intellectual difficulties in religious thought
"in order to appeal to the greatest audience of active people." Id. See also Alan Heimert,
The Great Awakening as Watershed, in RELIGION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 127-41 (John M.
Mulder & John F. Wilson eds., 1978) (asserting that the Great Awakening, the
intercolonial flurry of religious revivals in the 1740s, created the confidence that human
religious experience and activity could hasten the coming of the millenium and that this
was a powerful contribution to America's emerging nationalism).
120. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (summarizing the Court's acknowl-
edgment that Amish religious beliefs and conduct were inseparable for First Amendment
purposes).
121. ALBANESE, supra note 1, at 8. See also GREELEY, supra note 103, at 53-105 (ex-
plaining that religious systems consist of symbols and stories transmitted through individu-
als and institutions).
122. ALBANESm, supra note 1, at 8-9.
123. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 338 (1970). The Supreme Court recognized
this component in Welsh, describing religion's characteristic "consciousness of what is
right and should be done, of what is wrong and therefore should be shunned." See also
supra text accompanying note 101.
124. See ELIADE, supra note 103, at 68-104 (describing the sacralization of time through
religious ritual and festival).
125. ALBANESE, supra note 1, at 8.
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munity which shares the beliefs and activities, cultivates and con-
firms the presence of religious awe." As the religious beliefs
provide the intellectual basis for the individual's sense that he
participates in the other power, the conduct and community arising
out of these beliefs are the means by which the believer infuses
the transcendent quality of religion, the power of the other, into
daily life.
Together, the four religious expressions ground believers in
physical, temporal, and social contexts. By defining theological,
moral, and community boundaries, religion shapes significant iden-
tities for individuals in their immediate surroundings and in the
universe:
[O]ur religion concerns the way we locate ourselves in
space through the arrangement of sacred rites and holy
places as boundary markers. It concerns, too, the way we
locate ourselves in time through origin stories or theologi-
cal traditions that also express boundaries .... It concerns
our place among other human beings, and it means staking
out a claim on the landscape of identity. 27
Thus, an infringement upon an individual's religious liberty threat-
ens the means by which the individual defines and perceives her
very identity.
Contrasting religious experience with the experience of the
nonreligious exposes the value of religious identity, the encounter
with the awesome other power. In The Sacred and The Pro-
fane," Mircea Eliade explores the history of religion incorporat-
ing philosophical and psychological perspectives. Eliade unabashed-
ly affirms and glorifies the value of religious experience in human
existence by elucidating the ways in which "religious man attempts
to remain as long as possible in a sacred universe, and hence what
his total experience of life proves to be in comparison with the
experience of the man without religions feeling, of the man who
lives, or wishes to live, in a desacralized world."'29
Eliade defines the "sacred," the sense of religiousness, simply
126. See GREELEY, supra note 103, at 119-24 (articulating the role of the community in
validating and enhancing religious awe and hopefulness).
127. ALBANESE, supra note 1, at 5.
128. See ELIADE, supra note 103 and accompanying text.
129. Id. at 13.
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as "the opposite of the profane."'30 In elaborating why humans
tend to seek the sacred and invite it into their lives, he describes
what religion contributes to the believer's identity: "[t]he sacred is
equivalent to a power, and, in the last analysis, to reality. The
sacred is saturated with being. Sacred power means reality and at
the same time enduringness and efficacity..'.' By recognizing the
sacred, believers receive this power and become part of what is
real, what endures. Whereas living in the sacred connects an indi-
vidual with objective reality, one living separate from the sacred
becomes powerless: "paralyzed by the never-ceasing relativity of
purely subjective experiences."'3
Religious faith transfers the power of the sacred to the individ-
ual. One need not abandon one's identity in this world by becom-
ing the other. "By manifesting the sacred, any object becomes
something else, yet it continues to remain itself, for it continues to
participate in its surrounding cosmic milieu."'' While the imme-
diate reaction to the sacred is to perceive it as "other" than one-
self, the believer recognizes that it is simultaneously similar, and
attempts to personify it.' Identification with the sacred enhances
one's awe, for it is the only means with which one may honor the
other.35
Identifying with and becoming part of the sacred implicitly
draws the believer closer to the absolute source of the other pow-
er.'36 Commonly, religions assign the sacred some sort of divine
symbol or identity; most religious traditions incorporate the image
or figure of gods or a God. 7 By participating in the sacred one
may approach the divine.'
Identifying with the sacred imbues life with a sense of purpose
and contribution to the universe. 9 Assuming the sacred gives
130. Id. at 10.
131. Id. at 12.
132. Id. at 28.
133. See ELADE, supra note 103, at 12.
134. See GREELEY, supra note 103, at 71.
135. Id.
136. See ELLADE, supra note 103, at 70 (describing sacred time as necessarily sanctified
by the presence and activity of the gods).
137. See GREELEY, supra note 103, at 73-78 (referring to God as the image created to
articulate what one encounters in experiences of grace, while acknowledging that the idea
of such an entity is almost universally available to mankind)"
138. See ELIADE, supra note 103, at 106 (asserting that during religious experiences,
religious people attempt to approach God).
139. See GREELEY, supra note 103, at 54.
915
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
humans incredible responsibility. This responsibility is "a different
kind of responsibility from those that, to us modems, appear to be
the only genuine and valid responsibilities. It is a responsibility on
the cosmic plane, in contradistinction to the moral, social, or his-
torical responsibilities that are alone regarded as valid in modem
civilizations."'" With vast responsibilities, religious believers ac-
quire a significant role in the enduring universe. Thus, religious
experience links the individual's purpose to "Higher Purposes."'
141
The import of the role of believers contrasts starkly to the import
of the role of the profane: "profane man insists that he is constitut-
ed only by human history, hence by the sum of the very acts that,
for religious man, are of no importance because they have no
divine models."'42
With one's identity and activity on earth linked to sacred pur-
poses, religious faith fulfills its ultimate function. In "the return to
the sources of the sacred and the real ... human existence appears
to be saved from nothingness and death."'143 Religion promises
salvation by confirming the purposefulness of human experi-
ence.'" Through religious experience, a believer's actions assume
cosmic significance. 4  By participating in the sacred, that which
is enduring and real, "one's existence has meaning in some ulti-
mate sense because it exists within an eternal and infinite scheme
of things."'" The finiteness of earthly presence is no longer terri-
fying, 47 for the other, of which the believer is a part, exists and
endures. The hopefulness that results from religious experience
enables a future," despite the reality of death. While convention-
al medicine ceases to assert any power in the face of death, reli-
gion provides a means through which humans may transcend it.
140. ELIADE, supra note 103, at 93.
141. GREELEY, supra note 103, at 54-57 (concluding that religion validates the
purposefulness of human life).
142. EIADE, supra note 103, at 100.
143. Id. at 107.
144. See GREELEY, supra note 103, at 54.
145. BECKER, supra note 109, at 91 (asserting that creatures attain cosmic significance
by affirming connection with the force at the heart of creation).
146. Id. at 90 (interpreting Kierkegaard's message that man endures anxiety to arrive at
faith).
147. See ELIADE, supra note 103, at 107 (describing the pessimistic vision of profane
man).
148. See GREELEY, supra note 103, at 54.
[Vol. 45:891
1995] WHEN RELIGIOUS PARENTS DECLINE MEDICAL TREATMENT
B. The Example of Christian Science
The world view offered by Christian Science demonstrates how
religious identity and experience may fulfill the existential needs of
humans. Christian Science grants every believer the resources to
become the sacred through healing. "[I]t focuses initially and pri-
marily on the potential for transformation and healing within the
individual."'49 The spiritual victory is not simply an opportunity,
but an immediate goal for the believer to be achieved in this
life.50
The immediacy of the opportunity illuminates the appeal of
Christian Science:
Evidence of the religious experiences of long-term, commit-
ted adherents of Christian Science suggests that it may
have survived for more than a century because it has met a
more basic religious need. Disaffected Protestants, particu-
larly, have seen in it a release not just from bodily suffer-
ing but also from spiritual malaise-an alternative to the
attitude that accepts with Christian resignation the tragedies
of present life in hope of compensation either in a life
beyond or according to some transcendent scale of eternal
values.''
Christian Science provides hope in this life by empowering believ-
ers with the sacred.
The sole reliance of believers on spiritual treatment testifies
that the "Spirit," the Christian Science construction of the sacred, is
the only source of what is real:
To understand what this means to them, it is necessary to
recognize the centrality of their conviction the Spirit alone
is real in the fullest sense of the term. Matter, on the other
hand, is regarded as a false, distorted, temporal, finite sense
of being, from which Christianity, "scientifically" under-
stood, progressively frees one."'
149. Mircea Eliade, Christian Science, in CHIsmTAN ScimNc A SOURCEBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY MATERMUAlS supra note 1, at 5, 10.
150. Id.
151. 1l
152. ROBERT PEEL, SPIRITUAL HEALING IN A SCImNlFc AGE 34 (1987) (encouraging
mutual understanding and tolerance between the disparate systems of spiritual and scientif-
ic treatments).
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To the Christian Scientist, "matter" is an errant concept of sub-
stance reflecting the limitations of the human mind, and is ulti-
mately unreal.'53 Human beings consist of much more than mat-
ter; while Christian Science doctrine does not deny that humans
experience pain and suffering, 5 4 it affirms that their spiritual re-
sources are boundless. Through understanding, an individual can
arrive at and live out the realization of spiritual selfhood which
renders him as God created: "perfect, upright and free."'55 The
"only reality of sin, sickness and death is the awful fact that
unrealities seem real to human, erring belief."'5 Once the individ-
ual fully grasps that God created humans perfect, without capacity
for sickness, the believer is exempt from it. 7
Perceiving illness as a symptom of imperfect understanding
provides the Christian Scientist with a means of transcending death.
Christian Science does not profess to have attained the spiritual
perfection to have conquered death. Rather, it teaches that the
person lives, "continuing to strive for perfection after 'death' and
that what appears to be an ending is merely a passing, ascending
to a realm of higher understanding."'5 As life is the pursuit of
Truth, it is deathless; thus, the Christian Science creed offers spiri-
tual healing not as a means to prevent death, but to pursue perfec-
tion and truth.'59
In the health care dilemma presented by the opposition of
Christian Science parents to conventional medical treatment, both
the state that attempts to penalize the parents for withholding treat-
ment, and the religious parents wish to further the child's well-
being."6  The conflict between them reveals that conventional
medicine, notwithstanding its incredible powers to improve the
quality of this life, and often prolong it, does nothing to assuage
153. See Eliade, supra note 149, at 6-9.
154. Talbot, supra note 11, at 1643 (summarizing Christian Science doctrine regarding
spiritual treatment).
155. Pam Robbins & Robley Whitson, Mary Baker Eddy's Christian Science, in CHRIS-
TIAN SCIENCE: A SOURCEBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY MATERIALS, supra note 1, at 14, 16.
156. Id. at 17 (citing MARY BAKER EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE
ScRwPTURES 466 (1906)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 23.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (documenting the parents' belief that
they act in the child's best interest).
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existential fear arising out of the inevitability of death. For those in
fear, religion may provide the only remedy.
IV. FArTH iN THE CRrTCAL CARE CONTEXT
A. The Value of the Parents' Faith
Proceeding with the view that religious faith offers believers a
sense of existential meaning and identity when the believer con-
fronts the frightening boundary between life and death, the need
for religion among parents facing a child's serious illness may be
particularly acute, perhaps unique,' and thereby its value is of
the greatest significance. For the parent facing a child's life-threat-
ening illness, numerous emotions compound the existential anxiety
that generally accompanies death. Confusion intensifies the grief
and fear of loss. "Children are not supposed to die. The death of a
child is a senseless injustice. A child's death . . . is incomprehensi-
ble." 6
2
The confusion results in part from the sense that the world is
out of order. "The natural order is that parents should die
first.'' 6  Confronting the loss of a child, parents inevitably ques-
tion their roles and responsibility. The crisis "brings to the fore the
ultimate issues of powerlessness, guilt, and the fact that as parents
they were unable to protect their own child."'" Many believe the
loss of a child is the worst tragedy a human being can suffer."
Such a crisis is the arena in which faith performs its ultimate
function. From the creeds, codes, cultuses, and community of reli-
gion, parents 'may find an explanation for their suffering, meaning
among confusion, and hopefulness in the face of death." The
161. See SHERRY E. JOHNSON, AFTER A CHILD DIES: COUNSEUNG BEREAVED FAMIIES
at xiii (1987) (citing a philosopher of thanatology who describes parental grief as unique
because "it arouses the cultural taboo of children dying before their parents").
162. JOAN HAGAN ARNOLD & PENELOPE BUScHMAN GEMMA, A CHD DIES: A POR-
TRAIT OF FAMILY GRIEF at xi (1983).
163. James P. Zimmerman, The Bereaved Parent, in ActrrE GRIEF 126, 129 (Otto
Margolis et al. eds., 1981). See also JOHNSON, supra note 161, at xiii (noting the nagging
sense of confusion surrounding the death of a child due to the reversal of the natural
order).
164. JOHNSON, supra note 161, at xiii.
165. ARNOLD & GEMMA, supra note 162, at xi (contending that the experience of los-
ing a child is special and like none other). See also Zimmerman, supra note 163, at 126
(citing a priest describing parents who experienced the death of a child as members of
the "world's unlucidest club").
166. See supra notes 108-17 and accompanying text (discussing the function of religion
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connection to the other enabled by faith may be the only solace
available. When a religious parent faces a child's life-threatening
illness is precisely the moment when the constitutional guarantee of
free exercise is most needed and deserved. 7
The inestimable value of religious liberty may, in principle, be
unchanging. But if one accepts that crisis may intensify the
believer's need for religious solace, and thereby the significance of
the individual's religious liberty, the combined statutory and judi-
cial response to parents who decline medical treatment for their
gravely ill children seems simply backwards. As indicated in Part
II, states generally respect the parent's right to decline conventional
treatment for religious reasons until the child's condition is life-
threatening. 6 ' At that point under traditional analysis, the state's
interest in protecting child welfare becomes sufficiently compelling
to override the parents' religious liberty. That is, at the point the
parent faces the extreme crisis in which the need for religion is
most apparent and immediate, the parent's religious interest must
give way in order to avoid civil and criminal penalties. It is illogi-
cal that the guarantee of religious free exercise ought to protect
religious liberty only until it attains its highest value.
Beyond the affront to the parents' religious liberty, a court that
automatically elevates the state's interest in protecting children
disregards the harm to society that accompanies a decision to pun-
ish the parents. As expressed in Yoder, governmental policies
which force religious minorities to assimilate their fundamental
beliefs and practices present an objective danger to society. 9 The
free exercise clause recognizes the legitimacy of an American
citizen's allegiance to an individual conception of divine authority,
even as the content of the allegiance conflicts with the democratic
will of the people. 7 According to the Supreme Court, no as-
in the face of suffering and death).
167. Critics may immediately counter that the child's illness may be life-threatening only
if conventional medical treatment is withheld, as in the case of diabetes or some forms of
meningitis. This argument is somewhat circular however, as the issue itself is whether
parents ought to be punished for declining medical care and not whether medicine could
cure the illness.
168. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
169. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218-19 (1972). See also supra notes 68-70 and
accompanying text.
170. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1516 (1990) (investigating the historical underpin-
nings of the free exercise clause to substantiate the propriety of religious exemption).
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sumptions may be made that the majority way of life is "right" or
the minority "wrong;" the government may not condemn a "way of
life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or
interest of others.''. A democracy cannot tolerate disrespect for
the views of a religious minority which do not affect the private
rights of others or public safety. The commitment to protecting
religious liberty renders totalitarian tyranny a "philosophical impos-
sibility,"'" as diversity of religious belief splits the allegiance of
citizens among factions."7 Upholding the rights of religious mi-
norities under the free exercise clause enhances the security of
every member of a democratic society.
B. Faith's Impact on the Effectiveness of Punishment
The nature of the parents' religious experience and identity
renders legal punishment of limited effectiveness as a means of
furthering the states' asserted interest in child welfare. The justifi-
cation for holding parents liable for their failure to obtain conven-
tional medical care rests on a state's general authority to protect
the welfare of children. 74 However, the Walker court's acknowl-
edgment that the state is unlikely to learn of a child's illness in
time to take protective measures 75 implicitly concedes that the
legislative scheme enforced against the parents cannot advance the
asserted end in all cases. If a state's professed interest is in the
particular child whose life is threatened by parental reliance on
spiritual treatment, punishing the parent after the child is already
dead fails to meet that purpose. If the state's interest is more deter-
rent in nature, that interest conflicts with the state's admittedly
constitutionally commanded noninterference policy.'76
A state's reliance on the deterrent effect of actions against
parents assumes the superiority of its authority over the sacred or
other power imposed by the parents' religious identity. Even where
the religious doctrine advocates compliance with secular laws,"
171. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 223-24.
172. McConnell, supra note 170, at 1516.
173. CARTER, supra note 33, at 37.
174. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 24-44 and accompanying text (chronicling the states' and courts'
unwillingness to interfere in parental decision making unless the child's life is seriously
endangered).
177. See, e.g., Thomas C. Johnsen, Christian Scientists and the Medical Profession: A
Historical Persepctive, in CHRISTIAN ScIENcE: A SOURCEBOOK OF CONTEMORARY MATE-
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this assumption may be unfounded. As James Madison perceived,
"that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious
truth ... is an arrogant pretension."'' 8 Under the theory of free
exercise, the government legitimately uses its power to correct
humans errors in earthly judgments, such as economics and natural
morals. However, the government must defer when the scope of
the individual's judgment lies outside the government's arena.'79
The claims of the "universal sovereign" precede the claims of civil
rule, both in time and in authority.'80 And if a nonbeliever ac-
cepts the existential benefits religious faith provides, the elevation
of religious authority over secular authority seems understandable.
Accepting this rationale is potentially dangerous. Claims of the
superiority of religious authority might be appropriated to refute the
deterrent value of any exercise of state authority over religious
believers, rendering the state powerless against any citizen whose
religious beliefs conflicted with a civil law. However, deterrence
seems especially nonsensical where parents have relied on faith
throughout a child's grave illness. The persistence of their faith
evidences the force and preeminence of the other power in the
parents' decisions concerning the child. In circumstances that less
dramatically invoke religion's ultimate function, civil authority may
take priority without coercing the individual's religious assimilation.
The idea that the parents' health care choice results from sub-
mission to a higher authority exposes the inequality of penalizing
religious parents for the child's failure to recover. Common law
accepts completely the fact that patients may not fully grasp the
information necessary to make an "intelligent" health care deci-
sion;'8 ' ordinarily, an individual "has only his physician to whom
he can look for enlightenment."'8 2 Despite their lack of medical
understanding and their inability to control the outcome, parents
RIALS, supra note 1, at 167, 169 (Christian Science Publishing Society ed., 1990) (citing
Mary Baker Eddy's position that the Church must not attempt to set aside laws which
promote the general good of any community, and the group's record of cooperation with
public health authorities).
178. McConnell, supra note 170, at 1498 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Re-
monstrance Against Religions Assessments, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183,
187 (G. Hunt ed., 1901)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1512 (arguing that this premise is the theoretical foundation of the free
exercise clause).
181. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.) (defining the scope of
informed consent in health care decision-making), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
182. Id.
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selecting conventional treatment options, like parents withholding
medical treatment for religious reasons,' no doubt believe their
decision is in the best interest of the child. Yet, they are not penal-
ized when medical treatment fails. Without trivializing the parents'
religious faith, a court cannot distinguish this total deference to a
physician from submission to a higher authority inherent in reli-
gious belief.
The sincere intent of religious parents to promote the child's
well-being also limits the deterrent effect of the threat of legal
punishment. For the believer in spiritual healing, the choice is not
between the child's health and the individual's selfish desire to act
on his religious belief. Rather, the reliance on spiritual treatment
stems from an honest feeling that it is the most effective way of
caring for oneself and one's child.'84 Attesting to the sincerity of
the Christian Scientist position that spiritual treatment most effec-
tively promotes the child's well-being, the Manager of the Chris-
tian Science Church's Committee on Publication, Nathan A. Talbot,
explains that "[if] the only two options for care were medical
treatment or no treatment, Christian Scientists like others would
undoubtedly choose medical treatment.'' 8
Enhancing the child's welfare motivates the parent's religiously
influenced decision, not avoiding legal culpability or obtaining any
tangible benefits from the state. Because the religious directives
embody the power of the sacred, the parent who unquestioningly
183. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text (affirming the religious parents'
intent to benefit the child).
184. See Statement for Atlanta Centers for Disease Control, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSI-
BIrIY: CHRIST SCiENCE HEALING FOR CHILDREN 3 (Christian Science Publishing Soci-
ety ed., 1989) (summarizing the Christian Science views on health care); Worden, supra
note 11, at 50-51 (a nurse's testament that meeting with Jehovah's Witness parents helped
caregivers accept them as loving and caring parents who believe they act in the child's
best interest by withholding medical treatments).
185. Nathan A. Talbot, Government Should Not Interfere With Personal Beliefs, in
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY: CHRISTIAN SCIENCE HEALING FOR CHILDREN, supra note
184, at 7. Christian Science attempts to distinguish its practices from "faith" healers, those
who believe in miracles or beseech God for an exception from suffering. They do not
argue that their form of spiritual healing should be accommodated by the courts on First
Amendment grounds alone. Rather, they promote, as evidence, numerous accounts of heal-
ing over the last century that are published in Christian Science media. I have chosen
generally to ignore the "scientific" arguments posed by the movement, for the application
of scientific analysis to their claims defeats the universal significance of their nonuational
faith. The content of the religious system is investigated only to show how a religious
system answers an individual's questions of her role and destiny in the universe, not to
assess whose reliance on faith healing is more valid or reasonable.
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relies on faith and spiritual healing perceives much greater harm to
the child in deviating from those tenets than in the threat of prose-
cution from the state. To the extent a state hopes to deter those
parents who waver in their religious sincerity as to the reliability
of spiritual treatment, the fear of losing the seriously ill child
would seem to preclude the need to threaten these parents with
legal action. 86
IV. CONCLUSION
The controversy involving religious parents who decline con-
ventional medical treatment for their children reflects the conflict
resulting from the shared authority of religion and medicine in the
arena of death. While both religion and medicine contend with the
helplessness of humans against death, medicine defends us by
attempting to forestall death's arrival. In contrast, religion ultimate-
ly attempts to transcend the insignificance of life implied by
death's sure arrival. The election of the religious approach over the
scientific is incomprehensible to many members of modem society.
To this majority, the state's interest in protecting the child who
cannot choose for himself is an obvious justification for punishing
the parent who foregoes medicine to treat the child's life-threaten-
ing illness. But before a court mechanically adopts the justification
to impose criminal or civil penalties upon the parent, it must ac-
knowledge the nature of the infringement upon religious liberty.
Health care decision-making implicates people's fundamental
conceptions of the value and meaning of life which frequently take
shape within a religious framework.'87 However, health care
186. The fear of losing a child also seems to be a natural deterrent against nonreligious
parents feigning religious devotion to excuse them from liability for foregoing needed
medical treatment for their children, reducing the persuasiveness of the general objection
to free exercise exemption based on the fear of "strategic behavior." See supra note 88.
The religious conduct itself produces what appears to most observers to be the most se-
vere harm: the child's death. A parent would have to have allowed his child to die be-
fore he became "eligible" for exemption from the generally applicable criminal or wrong-
ful death penalties that attach to his failure to obtain medical treatment. As evidenced by
the decisions which aver the religious parents' beneficent intent toward their children, see
supra note 10 and accompanying text, courts are capable of assessing the intent of reli-
gious parents as they do other defendants. While it may be possible that criminally or
civilly negligent parents might attempt to claim the exemption, their ability to establish
the claims as legitimate seems unlikely.
The grave harm that parents would have to suffer before the religious exemption
from punishment would benefit them also assuages the concerns over governmental favor-
itism toward or establishment of religious groups. See supra note 88.
187. A medical doctor conveys the interrelationship between health care and religion by
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choices that are influenced by secular values may also implicate
the same existential needs and beliefs as traditionally religious
decisions. Several current phenomena contradict the notion that
traditional medical science is the "religion" of modem society,
capable of satisfying people's health needs. "Conventional" medi-
cine now incorporates life-saving technologies many individuals
wish to forego, as shown by the increasing prevalence of living
wills or medical directives,1 88 do-not-resuscitate orders,"89  and
comfort-care hospices." ° Alternative theories of medicine, includ-
ing Eastern and holistic attitudes toward health care, now compete
with the scientific tradition. 191
Simply by their prevalence, these trends increase the likelihood
that parents may wish to make parallel decisions to forego life-
positing three "religious" questions that tend to be asked by patients facing a medical
crisis, such as the diagnosis of a fatal or debilitating illness. "Why did this happen to
me? What can I learn about life and about myself from this experience? For what may I
hope?" Daniel W. Foster, Religion and Medicine: The Physician's Perspective, in
HEALTHIMEDICINE AND THE FAITH TRADITIONS: AN INQUIRY INTO RELIGION AND MEDI-
cI 245, 255 (Martin E. Marty & Kenneth L. Vaux eds., 1982). Further, religion and
medicine share authority in the same facets of human life: birth, diet, crises, and death.
188. See generally ALAN MEISEL, TIE RIGHT TO DIE § 10 (1989) (describing living
wills as part of a more general text on the development of the right to die); Abe Brown,
The Living Will and Durable Power of Attorney: Decisions About Dying, 17 CURRENT
HEALTH 18 (1991); Martha Henderson, Beyond the Living Will, 30 GERONTOLOGIST 480
(1990) (studying the effect of living wills on patients' anxiety about death).
189. See generally Cynthia B. Cohen & Peter J. Cohen, Required Reconsideration of
"Do-Not-Resuscitate" Orders in the Operating Room and Certain Other Treatment Set-
tings, 20 LAw, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE 354 (1992) (advocating the tailoring of
DNR orders to the needs, goals and values of individual patients); Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Guidelines for the Appropriate Use of Do-
Not Resuscitate Orders, 265 JAMA 1868 (1991) (detailing the American Medical Asso-
ciation guidelines for the use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation).
190. See generally ANNE MUNLEY, THE HOSPICE ALTERNATIVE A NEw CONTEXT FOR
DEATH AND DYING (1983) (discussing the need for hospices); PsYCHoSOCIAL CARE OF
THE DYING PATIENT (C. A. Garfield ed., 1978) (containing essays discussing terminal
patient care guidelines in relation to comfort care only).
191. See generally KRISTINE BEYERMAN ALSTER, THE HOLISTIC HEALTH MOVEMENT
(1989) (analyizing the holistic health movement); FRED M. FROHOCK, HEALING POwERs:
ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE, SPIRITUAL COMMUNITIES, AND THE STATE (1992) (discussing the
social impact of alternative medicine); JUNE S. LOWENBERG, CARING AND RESPONSIBILITY:
THE CROSSROADS BETWEEN HOLISTIC PRACTICE AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE (1989)
(describing differences between holistic and traditional approaches); Maryanne Garon, Con-
tributions of Martha Rogers to the Development of Nursing Knowledge, 40 NURSING OUT-
LOOK 67 (1992) (questioning prevailing scientific models and praising the contribution of
alternative paradigms such as existentialism and Eastern philosophy to the nursing profes-
sion); Pedro E. Ponce, Eastern Medicine Collides with Western Regulations at Mass. Acu-
puncture School, 40 CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION A32 (1993) (discussing the debate
over how states regulate alternative medical education).
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saving conventional treatment for their children." Admittedly,
exempting from punishment those whose decisions can be traced to
formal religious doctrine while punishing the rest evinces an unac-
ceptable inequality. However, the absence of religious conviction,
the absence of the sense of identity with the sacred, other power,
in nonreligious decisions may allow parents to pursue available
conventional treatments in extreme circumstances, circumventing
the problem of unevenly awarded exemptions.
Moreover, even if no resolution exists for the moment, the
problem of religious versus secular inequality at least ought to
force the state to rethink its view of the proper scope of its inter-
ference in parental health care decision-making for children. If the
state concludes that the current scheme, under which parents may
be punished for declining life-saving treatment for their children, is
the appropriate balance among its own and parents' interests, the
state must confront the nature and significance of the decisions in
which it intervenes. "Freedom in its highest form is the power to
sustain continuity in the face of death-not to eliminate death." 93
ANNE D. LEDERMAN
192. The issues surrounding DNR orders already include their use in pediatric care. See
Kin Lewis, Should Schools Honor Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders?, 13 NEA TODAY 59
(1994) (presenting the debate over the use of DNR orders for children in school versus
hospital settings). .Reliance on hospice care for children is also a current issue. See HOS-
PICE APPROACHES TO PEDIATRIC CARE (Charles A. Corr & Donna M. Corr eds., 1985).
193. CARSE, supra note 111, at 9.
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